What to Do About “Ant Corruption”?
Thought experiment. You’re in charge of the country and have turned your attention to anti-corruption programs. You have limited resources and need to choose between various options.
Do you:
1. Put your money towards enforcement at the high end (i.e., high-level officials/individuals, or large amounts of money); or
2. Go for a broad-spectrum approach of public media campaigns and training of local officials, hoping to reduce the overall incidence of corruption.
The obvious question here is where do you start? It’s an interesting thing to think about, particularly if the government decides at some point that a certain amount of low-end corruption is acceptable.
This was the topic of an article today by Global Times/Xinhua:
For regular government employees, their power may be limited but not so much as to deter them from occasional bribery and embezzlement, a phenomenon referred to as “ant corruption” that analysts say is becoming an increasingly common trend.
Experts warned that such “ant corruption” could harm the government’s credibility as it involves the officials working directly with the public to provide basic services.
Seems reasonable to conclude that if corruption is rampant, even if it is limited to de minimis amounts, that the public’s perception of the government would be seriously harmed. This might sound odd, but I am reminded of the reputation of the Mexican police. Growing up in California, where almost everyone goes down to Mexico at one time or another, the general perception was that the police there were just waiting to stop a gringo and shake him down for a few bucks. Maybe it was just me, but this colored my judgment of the Mexican government as a whole for many years. (If anything, that reputation is now worse!)
So this is one vote for going after all forms of corruption, even the small-time stuff. However, this may not be easy, particularly if such practices are commonplace:
“A small kickback or fee to express thanks is considered normal in my office or in the whole bureau,” an office clerk surnamed Li in Nanchong, Sichuan Province, told the Global Times. “I don’t think such a small amount of money will do any harm. It’s not like major corruption and we are just receiving people’s thanks after we do a small favor for them.”
Li, who was reluctant to reveal her full name, said that an employee rejecting such small bribes would be considered odd and ostracized by co-workers.
Sort of a variation on the “everyone is doing it” argument. Peer pressure is a powerful motivator, and most folks don’t want to be the odd man out, particularly in the workplace. Remember what happened to Serpico?
But getting back to our thought experiment, we have limited resources here. While we want to go after all types of bad actors (and the government does), we also need to admit that we can’t prioritize everything. Therefore, if we want to attack corruption, is it best to start with the big guys or the little guys?
One way to think about this is to ask what the goal is. Are we mostly worried about the billions of RMB that are embezzled every year? Is the fundamental problem related to public perception of government and administrative fairness? Are we mostly concerned about the victims of corruption (e.g. land swindles)?
Those are tough questions, and I don’t know the answers. Moreover, it’s not even clear what the effects are when you go after the big guys as opposed to the little guys. For example, take public perception of government. Stories about high-level officials that embezzle millions certainly sour public opinion of government. On the other hand, if every time folks go to a local government office for a routine transaction they are expected to grease a palm, then public opinion of the bureaucracy also takes a hit. Which is worse?
The most troubling issue here, buried halfway down that Global Times/Xinhua article, is that “ant corruption” seems to be getting worse:
Over 140,000 government staff received disciplinary punishments last year, among whom only 4,843 officials were over the county-level of administration. A total of 8.44 billion yuan in economic losses were recovered, according to the Ministry of Supervision on January 6.
These stories are not isolated cases but are becoming more and more common in China, according to the anti-corruption blue paper released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences earlier this month.
Forms of corruption have moved from mainly being perpetrated by individuals to group crimes using more careful methods to avoid detection. Corrupt officials are also favoring long-term bribes than short-term gains, the blue paper said.
Why is this getting worse? What does this tell us about enforcement efforts? Will this have a negative effect on social stability?
Too many questions, not enough answers, and a problem that isn’t going away anytime soon.
I have an idea to mitigate corruption that wouldn’t cost the government a dime. It’s kind of crazy, so bear with me: A free press, rule of law and an independent judiciary.
Haha, just kidding. Sounds like it’s time for another gimmicky anti-corruption campaign!
Ask any Chinese who comes to the states and has the experience of dealing with state/local bureaucracy for small permits and licenses what their impressions are, and I think you’ll find that they are pretty much positive.
At least in my small corner of the Left Coast, Chinese are amazed at how easy it is to get things done, and without any intimidation from petty functionaries. The difference is that public servants here don’t feel like they are doing you a favor for giving you what you are entitled to, and so it follows that they don’t feel as if you are obligated to put something into a tip jar that doesn’t exist in the first place.
To Stan,
excellent questions, and incredibly tough ones. Given the “limited resources” restriction, I suppose it has to be one or the other, as opposed to both. However, hopefully the powers that be don’t simply get bogged down with continued inaction, and essentially choose neither.
I agree with sinostand. A functioning legal system (and some institutional transparency) would be very helpful, such that the press, or whistleblowers, might end up doing some of the investigative work for you. I don’t know if such benefits would come completely devoid of cost…for starters, there might be a backlash among the very people who are having their palms greased, big and small. On the other hand, a free press, rule of law, and an independent judiciary might be more of a pipe-dream in CCP China than having a CHina that is devoid of corruption.
Stan
Interesting question, and my feeling is that it is already to late for an either / or approach. The entire system has been corrupted, and it will take a systemic approach to fixing the problems… petty crimes of a couple hundred crime are gateway drugs for cultural acceptance of larger scale bribery, and that is the real issue.
Operationally it is a huge (monumental) task, and one that I am not sure anyone has the stomach for as it reaches into every nook and cranny of China’s economic model.
So you’re saying “all or nothing” and guessing it will be “nothing”? Depressing . . .
I remember reading the news two weeks ago that Singapore has the highest paid public officials in the world (the PM makes something like 2 or 4 million USD per year), yet Singapore is also one of the least corrupt places in the world.
This has me thinking, if you paid the Chinese officials 4-5 times higher than the average population and then require complete transparency on where they are spending their time that would help the situation.
Why not “institutionalize” the corruption, and allow local governments to set up fast-track VIP lines for obtaining permits, licenses? Call bribes “special user fees”. They can even sell VIP cards, renewable yearly, and that way guarantee a good income stream.
I’m willing to bet that the above idea is already in de facto operation somewhere in China.
I’m sure that is happening somewhere. The only issue there is in whose pocket does the the money go.
I like that idea. Pay them enough so there is less financial need to take (or demand) bribes. But there needs to be a deterrent half of the equation as well, such that, if you still take bribes despite excellent pay, you will be burned at the stake.
I’ve been reading your blog for the last couple months. Great stuff! Regarding your through experiment, I think the key issue is whether the hypothetical country leader is actually committed to reducing corruption, or instead would like to create the appearance of being committed to reducing corruption through a short-term campaign.
If there is an actual commitment to fighting corruption, I believe the most important thing is transparency. If I was a leader, I would spent the limited funds for the promotion of increased access to government budget information and an education campaign on all levels. In short, I’d advocate something similar to the broad-spectrum approach you suggest. Initially a crack down on corruption should be avoided until greater transparency is in place, otherwise it may appear that the anti-corruption targets are only those that are less politically well connected.