Robert Samuelson, Op/Ed writer for the Washington Post, has some Spring Festival cheer in his new column, “The Danger Behind China’s ‘Me First’ Worldview.” I used to really enjoy Samuelson’s econ-heavy columns, but since the Obama administration began, he’s begun a downward spiral of cynicism and pessimism that is even too much for me.

The trend continues with his view of U.S.-China relations:

It’s become apparent from recent events that America’s political, business and scholarly elites have fundamentally misjudged China. Conflicts with China have multiplied.

[ . . . ]

The prevailing American assumption was that as China became richer, its interests and values would converge with those of the United States. China would depend increasingly on a thriving global economy. Freer domestic markets would loosen the stranglehold of the Communist Party.

OK, two problems here. First, I’m not sure that “the prevailing American assumption” is an accurate way to describe people who supported engagement. Sure, the Clinton administration and many engagement cheerleaders (myself included) suggested that friendly relations would speed along China’s liberalization on many fronts. But not everyone believed that and yet pushed for engagement anyway for a variety of reasons, such as commercial benefits.

Second, I don’t recall engagement supporters offering a timeline of when U.S. and China policy goals would converge and everyone would hold hands, dance around the May pole and love each other. No, those of us who supported engagement back when China joined WTO said that liberalization would be a long-term process, and I don’t remember predictions of policy convergence.

It’s only been ten years! In fact, it’s only been a short time since China liberalized and opened up at all (1978). I don’t know about the rest of you, but I remember 1978 — doesn’t seem like that long ago, particularly given China’s tumultuous modern history.

I understand that some people are impatient, though. We are a society that demands instant gratification. So what has happened in the last ten years? A hell of a lot, actually. Apparently Samuelson is not aware of the scope of legal, economic, and social reform during that period. I get it, he’s not a China guy, and he only seems to have done his background research by skimming Martin Jacques ‘masterful’ (his word, definitely not mine) book When China Rules the World.

Just because the U.S. and China have some significant policy disputes at the moment is no reason to ignore the dramatic developments that have occurred in this country over the last ten years (or better, since 1978). Relying on something like Jacques’ book, which has been criticized by a number of China hands recently, shouldn’t be good enough for the Washington Post. But China bashing is in vogue again these days, which I guess makes it OK.

Samuelson’s discussion of U.S. and China foreign policy frameworks is also puzzling:

The United States and China view the world in starkly different terms. The lesson of the Great Depression and World War II for Americans was that isolationism was self-defeating. Tried after World War I, it failed. The United States had to engage abroad to protect its economy and physical security. These core ideas remain the bedrock justifications for overseas military commitments and the promotion of an open world economy. The quest is for stability, not empire.

Note what Samuelson is saying here. The U.S. “internationalist” policy is fundamentally a realist strategy. International stability is good for the U.S. and its economy. I agree with this, for the most part, but we should not forget that the modern “world order” benefits the U.S., and not necessarily China.

China’s policies reflect a different notion: China First.

Unlike the isolationist America First movement of the 1930s, China First does not mean global disengagement. It does mean engagement on China’s terms. China accepts and supports the existing order when that serves its needs, as when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Otherwise, it plays by its own rules and norms.

Here is where Samuelson’s logic falls apart in my opinion. He already has characterized U.S. foreign policy as one of realist internationalism, whereby the U.S. engages the rest of the world to maintain stability and order, necessary for American security and commercial interests. If WTO membership was not in the U.S. interest, wouldn’t it quit? Why isn’t this a ‘U.S. First’ policy?

Samuelson contrasts this with China’s foreign policy, which is also one of internationalist engagement. However, unlike the U.S., which apparently “plays by” international rules and norms, China only does so when this is to its advantage. Seems to me that he is saying that China also acts according to a realist foreign policy. So what’s the problem with two nations acting according to their own interests?

Samuelson suggests that because of this policy ‘conflict,’ we find ourselves with a structural problem, described by Samuelson by the following:

Most American-Chinese disputes reflect China’s unwillingness to endanger domestic goals for international ends.

I tell you, it’s this sort of narrow-minded, U.S.-first thinking that makes everyone who isn’t an American in the world tear their hair out in frustration. The key issue here: those “international rules and norms” Samuelson talks about were established by the U.S. in order to further its interests! Nothing wrong with that, it follows a fundamentally realist foreign policy. Commentators like Samuelson, however, tend to glamorize the international order into something it isn’t and ignore the historical, Western roots of these organizations.

Let’s take a step back here and think about the current international order. The big international organizations (e.g. UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT/WTO) were for the most part established after World War II by the Americans and Europeans. These organizations were set up to maintain stability, act as a bulwark against the Eastern Bloc, and to spur economic growth in the West. Again, all of these things were in the interests of the U.S. — this is the basis of U.S. internationalist realist foreign policy.

Fast forward to 1978, or 2000 if you prefer. Developing country China is moving onto the world stage, pursuing its own interests like the U.S. and everyone else is doing. What does it see as the international structural framework but those organizations set up to further U.S., and European, interests. China works within these organizations because it is to China’s benefit, and it does not challenge “international rules and norms” that were set up 50 years previously by other nations primarily because it has no leverage in the early years, even if some of those rules are not to its benefit.

Fast forward again to 2010. China has continued to develop and now has more leverage. It’s foreign policy remains the same, international realist (the same as the U.S.). But now, with additional leverage, it has the ability to push back against those “international rules and norms” that it had to accept previously. It now asserts itself against a world order that was created by the West, primarily the U.S., more than 50 years ago.

So what is Samuelson’s policy prescription? The U.S. should start pushing back against China’s assertiveness, accepting that conflict is on the way:

It would be a tragedy if these two superpowers began regarding each other as adversaries. But that’s the drift. Heirs to a 2,000-year cultural tradition — and citizens of the world’s largest country — the Chinese have an innate sense of superiority, Jacques writes. Americans, too, have a sense of superiority, thinking that our values — the belief in freedom, individualism and democracy — reflect universal aspirations.

Greater conflicts and a collision of national egos seem inevitable.

I am again confused. Samuelson was talking about two nations that follow a realist strategy, which is inherently rational. Now, citing Jacques, he seems to be suggesting that U.S.-China conflict will be based, at least in part, by a nationalist clash of egos.

Nationalism is certainly one reason for tensions being exacerbated, but it is certainly not the fundamental source of conflict. Samuelson never really follows through on his reasoning in this column. If both the U.S. and China follow similar realist foreign policy strategies, is conflict inevitable or can something be done to assist with bilateral relations?

I certainly have my opinions. There will no doubt be situations where U.S. and China interests differ. There is nothing wrong with that, and both nations will have to agree to disagree on certain things when interests diverge.

On big, multilateral issues (climate change/energy, terrorism) where agreement is a necessity, both sides need to learn how to negotiate. The U.S. needs to learn how the “world order” is viewed by the rest of the world and be willing to make some changes as developing and newly-developed nations assert themselves. If the U.S. is unwilling to do so because of fears that it is somehow relinquishing its superpower status, it may find itself with escalating bilateral tensions with China as well as protracted multilateral problems.

China needs to soften its realist rhetoric and look for ‘win-win’ solutions to problems. It’s not enough to simply find a policy stance that benefits your own country. You also need to find the solution that will benefit a sufficient number of other countries. Only through consensus will solutions be adopted.

Samuelson, in arguing that China is a self-interested nation, fails to see that the U.S. follows the same policy framework. Instead of looking for ‘win-win’ solutions, he automatically suggests that the way forward is for the U.S. to stop being passive. This is a dangerous oversimplification of bilateral negotiations.