Slight exaggeration, but virtually all the articles you read about US-China relations gravitate towards one of two policy poles. Either the advice suggests strong engagement with the other party, or the author preaches alarm, confrontation and disengagement.

Additionally, US foreign policy types include strong engagement supporters (I am one of these), realists, and neocons (the latter preaching confrontation).

Today’s Op/Ed in the Washington Post by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is a real winner. It is a rare policy document these days in that it is a very neutral statement of a realist foreign policy (applicable to both countries), and it neither engages in touchy-feely pronouncements of deep engagement, nor tough talk about the “inevitable” China Threat.

Good stuff from someone who, politics aside, is still the master at analyzing the multilateral foreign policy landscape.

Below are a few choice bits with some additional comments, although I highly recommend the entire article.

On the one hand, the two economies have grown increasingly dependent on each other. China has a major interest in a stable — and preferably growing — U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America’s largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides.

This is not a new observation, but I like the way Kissinger frames this. Both countries are tied together, for the moment, because of global imbalances. They therefore have an interest in stability and need to coordinate policy, yet at the same time are trying to disentangle themselves from the other. This is not an easy fix for either country, and Kissinger sets up his argument well by front-loading this issue.

To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced.

I like the proactive tone here. Kissinger seeks a way out of potential bilateral trouble, noting at the same time that problems could occur, but are certainly not inevitable.

Here is Kissinger’s description of the future:

China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China’s political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns.

Sounds about right, and of course we have already moved several steps in that direction over the past few years, so little risk in this prediction. Kissinger then points out that a solution will not necessarily be easy given the track record of each country:

Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality.

Again, Kissinger strikes the right tone here. He is saying that each country tends to throw its weight around. Kissinger, as a realist, would not judge this as being an issue of what is right/wrong. He would rather evaluate such a stance based on what policy was appropriate at a given time. (I’m not a pure realist, so I would probably be slightly judgmental on this.)

So what sort of structure will work given this history and the need for bilateral cooperation?

To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end.

Anytime Henry Kissinger cautions against playing Cold War games, you gotta take this seriously.

But the point here is that a bipolar system would be a disaster. China and the US might end up being the two heavyweights in the near term, but if that means a bipolar, confrontational structure, that would spell disaster for the world.

As many nationalist politicians in both countries have the tendency to think in zero-sum-gain, Cold War frameworks, I think Kissinger’s advice is not just a throwaway line. This is important.

On the other hand, Kissinger also warns against a G-2 hegemony, where China and the US essentially decide amongst themselves on all major decisions, with the rest of the world simply falling into place behind them. I was surprised that Kissinger did not follow up on this point a bit more; he really doesn’t explain why a G2 would be a bad thing, and just states that a rise in fragmented, highly nationalistic states might be the result.

Anyway, his prescription for a global foreign policy framework is essentially a US-China led, multilateral structure:

While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.

Fair enough, and hard to argue with this ultimately since Kissinger is sort of hedging his bets. On the other hand, I like how he does not fall into one of the usual paradigms, which is perhaps a signal that we are moving into uncharted territory.

To reiterate, when Kissinger cautions against Pacific nations from sliding “into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics,” which is after all Kissinger’s comfort zone, it certainly is an indication that the ground underfoot has shifted.