Dan at CLB wants to know how the U.S. can sell arms to Taiwan while realistically hoping for China’s cooperation on Iranian sanctions:

The contrast is bizarre. It is as though we are stabbing someone right in the gut, and as that person lays bleeding on the ground, we ask if he might be so kind as to loan us a few bucks

I mean, if we want China to side with us on Iran, should we not be giving it something in return. Now maybe the Taiwan sales had to have been timed the way that they were, but I for one cannot help but thinking that something is wrong here. Are we just not all that concerned about a murderous bunch of Islamic extremists having a nuclear bomb or do we just have problems prioritizing?

I’ve written a couple of times on this subject and explained my pet theory about why these arms deals keep happening. But as for the diplomatic side of things, I’m starting to wonder whether both sides just don’t take this stuff as seriously as they used to back in the Cold War days.

This incident seems to be following the usual pattern. The deal is announced on a preliminary basis. Sources in China (not the front page of People’s Daily, but maybe a comment made by someone in the military) says that the deal would be a terrible idea and that there would be repercussions that would harm the bilateral relationship.

Next, the deal goes through anyway after frantic speculation on both sides about how it might be restructured to placate either the PRC or Taiwan. Then the formal deal is announced, and the “fireworks” begin. After that, we see the usual condemnation in the Chinese press (this time a real news blitz) and by academics and government officials.

Stage two of the condemnation is the threat phase. Beijing lists all the things that it will do to punish the U.S. because of the deal, including discontinuing military exchanges, cancellation of certain events, sanctioning the companies that are involved in the sale (I’m sympathetic to this last one). China always says that it regrets being forced into that position of course. On the U.S. side, more “regret” and feigned surprise that the Chinese government would really be upset over all this.

Finally, you can always dig out some choice quotes in secondary media accounts (or if you’re lucky, you talk to friends “in the know”) by officials who say, with a wink and a nod, that this is how the game is played and that after six months or so, things will again get back to normal, whatever that means.

This is referred to by the D.C. set as “political kabuki theater,” a weird reference that essentially means it is a lot of show and of little substance.

If the folks in charge see this as kabuki theater, they are less likely to worry over fallout, such as the effects on Iran policy. They are also less likely to even check out what those secondary effects might be, since the whole thing isn’t really important anyway.

Blake Hounshell isn’t entirely convinced of the “kabuki theater” theory, but he does come close on the FP blog:

Obama administration officials had been expecting some blowback from the arms sales, and are downplaying China’s reaction, but I wonder if even they see Beijing as upping the ante. Is this going to be the usual loud, public show of anger, followed by a return to business as usual? Or is China feeling its strength and looking to demonstrate that it can force the mighty United States to change course?

It’s early Sunday morning, and I’m engaging in a bit of blogging flight of fancy here (i.e. I might be full of shit). But once you see this process work itself out time after time, you do start to wonder if the folks in charge stop taking the rhetoric seriously after a while.

That would be a serious mistake, and it certainly sounds like a recipe for miscommunication and a surprising escalation of bilateral tensions at a time when relations are a bit strained already.

But what the hell do I know? My solution is to not sell the damned weapons in the first place, an option that would get me laughed at by folks in D.C.

This story hit my Inbox yesterday, first with news that the new eviction rules would be forthcoming. Several major papers (foreign and domestic) reported on the new development. Here’s a basic description from The Guardian:

The draft rules, issued today by the state council ‑ China’s cabinet ‑ would ban developers and demolition crews from forcing people out through violence or by shutting off water and electricity. They would also demand that compensation be set at market price and that where homes are judged “old and dangerous”, 90% of residents would have to agree to projects. Demolitions would be halted if occupants brought lawsuits. At present, they can go ahead even when challenged.

Most China watchers are already aware of how important, and sensitive, this issue is in terms of politics and social stability. Each year there are tens of thousands of episodes of unrest in the PRC, from your basic peaceful protests to full-blown riots involving lots of folks. The top two reasons why this happens relate to land ownership/compensation and environment/pollution.

When people are either thrown off their land or given inadequate compensation, this does not have a huge effect on the economy. Neither does it result in millions of people becoming homeless. This is not primarily an economic issue, but rather a sociopolitical one.

Evictions of this nature, particularly when the situation pits a poor tenant and a rich developer, are incredibly symbolic. The phenomenon highlights the imbalances in the economy, the ever-widening income gap, and the shortcomings of China’s ongoing economic development. In short, improper evictions are an embarrassment for a government that has historically promised to uphold socialist principles. (more…)

These come out every so often, so I wouldn’t call this particularly groundbreaking. It’s also difficult to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

I don’t usually dive deeply into the literature in this area either, so I’m not following any quantitative data like surveys. I usually rely on anecdotal evidence from friends, colleagues and clients as well as personal experience (i.e., my opinion that things have gotten much better over the past several years might be complete bullshit).

Anyway, the new rules contain a bit of insight on what some of the current problems are: (FYI, there are some English errors with the Xinhua article I am excerpting. I have not bothered to fix the mistakes.)

In an effort to prevent abuse of judicial power and fight corruption, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a new regulation Wednesday to list a great number of restrictions against court staff, ranging from taking bribery to committing adultery with litigants.

The move came after Huang Songyou, former SPC vice president was sentenced on January 19 to life imprisonment for taking bribes and embezzlement. Huang was convicted of taking more than 3.9 million yuan (about $574,000) in bribes from 2005 to 2008.

In other words, the incident was embarrassing, and action was needed to: 1) fight judicial corruption; and 2) let the public know that judicial corruption is being dealt with. Depending on your level of cynicism, goal #1 or #2 is of paramount importance.

The regulation stipulates that judiciary staff will be punished if they are found meddling and intervening court cases, giving bribes to law enforcement personnel, beating or verbally abusing petitioners and over-running timetables to enforce court rulings.

Most of these seem rather obvious. Beating litigants was, I suspect, officially frowned upon prior to these rules. Of note is the prohibition against “meddling and intervening,” which of course covers a lot of territory, including the very common practice of forcing litigants to settle by essentially refusing to rule on a case.

The regulation prohibits judiciary staff from tipping off or asking favors for litigants.

Tip offs are still common, although many times information sharing by court staff is fairly benign. Litigants will often receive advance warnings on rulings and might even know a judge’s predisposition of a particular argument during proceedings. When this is done in favor of one side at the expense of another in ex parte discussions, however, it is wholly unfair.

Judiciary staff are restricted from leaving the Chinese mainland without authorization, prolonging visits or obtaining permanent residence permits in areas outside the mainland without authorization, or acquiring foreign nationality without permission.

In addition to straightforward corruption potential, I’m not sure specifically what practices this is intended to combat. I haven’t come across this problem before personally.

Judiciary staff will be punished if they commit adultery or have sexual relations with litigants or relatives of litigants, according to the regulation.

OK, apologies here, but I am forced in this instance to once again respond with one of my favorite George Costanza quotes, which one could imagine a judge using after being caught in flagrante delicto with a litigant:

Was that wrong? Should I not have done that? I tell you, I gotta plead ignorance on this thing, because if anyone had said anything to me at all when I first started here that that sort of thing is frowned upon… you know, cause I’ve worked in a lot of offices, and I tell you, people do that all the time.

That’s why these rules need to be written down sometimes, to make absolutely clear what is/isn’t appropriate behavior. Heh heh.

They are also banned from intentionally prolonging, or refusing to enforce court rulings, and forcing litigants to withdraw lawsuits, receiving intermediation or reconciliation terms that would hurt litigants’ interests.

This to me is really key since I’ve come across this problem so many times. However, there is a potential conflict between these rules and future political attitudes.

In the past, we have seen pressure from government higher-ups, who let judges know that large numbers of judicial disputes don’t look so good to the outside world as China attempts to build a harmonious society. As a result, judges are periodically instructed to either hold rulings in limbo or, alternately, strong-arm litigants to settle.

These rules purport to stop such “meddling,” but I suspect this is another instance of the politicians telling the judges “Stop interfering with cases unless or until we tell you to do so.” I suppose a nicer way of putting it is that judges should not improperly influence outcomes unless there is an overriding State interest. (You choose which description you like better.)