OK, here’s more on "China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia and Africa," a report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. My last post dealt with some basics about U.S. China policy.

Onward, we get to talk about U.S. soft power:

One former U.S. Government official speculates that although America has massive remaining reserves of soft power, they have become a ‘‘non-renewable resource’’ given current U.S. policies. Others point to multiple global survey results on international views of the United States, saying ‘‘the downward trend is unmistakable.’’

Ouch, that hurts. In fact, it would have looked in worse in comparison to China’s international image a few months ago, before the recent "troubles" began. Still, the U.S. is not winning any awards these days for being a solid world citizen. By the way, I like the use of "non-renewable resource." Cute.

Let’s finally get down to the point. How is China using its soft power in the world today? Here’s one opinion:

China is seen to be trying to project soft power by portraying its own system as an alternative model for economic development, one based on authoritarian governance and elite rule without the restrictions and demands that come with political liberalization.

Maybe China is "seen" this way, but I find it to be a fairly unsophisticated way of looking at China’s foreign policy. Actually, to be honest, I find it to be completely wrong. I do not see China out there in the world proudly promoting its "system" to the developing world. Buying oil and other commodities, yes. Preaching authoritarianism? Not so much.

Where does this view come from? I think that whenever China is seen as a successful up-and-comer, some folks in the West feel threatened, and lots of Op/Ed columnists write ad nauseum about the China "model" as an alternative to liberal democracy. This artificial struggle makes Cold Warriors happy, but I can’t find any evidence that this fundamental clash of political philosophy (I saw this with tongue firmly in cheek) is originating from over here.

And, no surprise, here is one of the reasons why the U.S. keeps navel gazing (hint: its foreign policies over the past few years have sucked):

Having progressed on a steady path in the last three decades on multiple global economic and political endeavors, China’s robust international engagement since 2000 has caught many by surprise and has prompted growing American disagreement and debate over PRC motivations and objectives. The fact that much of this international engagement has expanded while the United States has been preoccupied with its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan also is causing a growing degree of American introspection. Moreover, many fear that China’s growing international economic engagement is going hand-in-hand with expanding political influence.

Thus ends Part II. I will wrap things up in Part III - pros/cons of China’s soft power.

Spent my insomnia hours last night reading "China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia and Africa." This was a report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (download .PDF here). I was interested in this mostly by what it tells us about the author(s) and of the U.S. perception of China. We all have our own opinions about China’s role in the developing world, so that’s sort of old hat at this point. Perception and policy is much more fun to talk about.

So anyway, here are a few choice excerpts with my comments (where appropriate).

Although U.S. Administrations for decades have pursued consistent engagement with China, periodic questions arise about whether the U.S. approach is based on a well-articulated and coherent strategy or is simply an approach of convenience that should be reassessed in the face of China’s rise.

Outside the Administration, the U.S. policy debate continues to be characterized by the strident dynamics that arose in the mid-1990s, in which American hard-liners (self-described as the ‘‘Blue Team’’) are pitted against those advising cooperation and engagement with China (pejoratively labeled as the ‘‘Red Team’’ by the opposing group). Thus, there is little agreement about the degree of threat or challenge China poses to the United States.

This last bit is quite an understatement. The disagreement in question is between rational folks and xenophobic Cold Warriors. Have I mentioned before how thoroughly I dislike the "Blue Team" and wingnuts like Michael Ledeen (he is currently focused on nuking Iran, but even so).

More on the distinction between the two groups. Note the terminology:

In the vocal minority are those who view China as a growing military menace with malign intent. These hardliners have been perceived sometimes by others as agitators whose counsel to treat China as a major threat to U.S. interests is designed to justify huge U.S. military budgets and is more likely to bring about conflict with China than to deter it.

The view that has been pursued more openly by U.S. Administrations is one that counsels cooperation and engagement with China as the best way to integrate China into the prevailing global system as a ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’— a nation that has ‘‘a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.’’ But opponents of this approach typically paint these as the views of ‘‘panda-huggers’’ who, seduced by the potential of the China market, are oblivious to PRC hostile intent, cave in to PRC wishes and demands unnecessarily, and thereby squander U.S. strategic leverage and compromise U.S. interests.

The confrontational and highly-charged dynamic between these two polar views continues to make elusive the kind of pragmatic and reasoned policy discourse that could create greater American consensus on how the United States should position itself to meet the challenges China poses.

Surprised at the boldness of this language? I am, sort of. In the above passage, we are told that China bashers are, in part, using the threat of China to justify military spending. Moreover, and obviously, this sort of thing is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This is one of the reasons I dislike the bashers so much. If you talk about armed conflict long enough, people start to believe it’s inevitable. Then you build more weapons, and violence becomes even more likely. Nasty spiral o’ death, that. It’s also rather difficult to discuss the environment, trade, and other bilateral initiatives when the "Blue Team" reduces everything to 1920s, or perhaps 1950s, stereotypes.

I think I’ll wrap up this post and turn to the actual soft power stuff in a fresh one. The comments here on U.S. policy stand on their own, and this is running a little long anyway.

This is a slightly old story by now, but it gave me a giggle, so it’s worth running with it. I really don’t like self-important activists, particularly actors/singers who get involved in geopolitical issues. They almost always simplify things, have gigantic egos, and do not have either the education or training to really know how to make progress. In the case of Mia Farrow, my blunt reaction is why would anyone listen to her pontificate about anything? Anyway, enjoy reading about the corporate smackdown, as I did:

After taking criticism from activist groups over the last few months, some Olympic sponsors are starting to criticize right back.

On Thursday [last week], Mia Farrow’s activist group, Dream for Darfur, issued a report card that roundly criticized most of the major Olympic sponsors.

For months, the group has been asking the sponsors to comply with requests both tame (meet with Farrow) and more involved (contact the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee regarding Darfur).

The group is calling for pressure because the Sudanese government buys its weapons from China with the foreign currency it makes from selling China its oil. China, meanwhile, protects Sudan from excessive attention in the UN Security Council.

Even after 9 of the 19 sponsors it had singled out agreed to meet with Farrow, the group said it had seen little progress from the corporations.

In the report card, it gave 16 of 19 sponsors a D or an F. The highest marks were earned by Adidas, McDonald’s and Eastman Kodak. The group was "really not pleased with the progress," said Dream for Darfur’s executive director, Jill Savitt.

In response, some sponsors began criticizing the group’s approach.

"For an organization that has not eased the suffering of a single individual on the ground in Darfur to criticize those who are helping thousands every day is more than ironic," a Coca-Cola spokesman, Kelly Brooks, wrote via e-mail. "This is not a report card on sponsors’ good works, this is simply a report card judging companies solely on the basis of the Dream for Darfur yardstick - a company’s willingness to publicly pressure a sovereign nation to intervene in the activities of another country."

Coca-Cola’s chief executive, E. Neville Isdell, wrote a column published last week in The Financial Times with similarly harsh words.

Johnson & Johnson also issued a sharp response to the report card.

"At Johnson & Johnson, we’ve worked hard for years to help the people of Darfur, which is consistent with the commitment of Johnson & Johnson to contribute to better health around the world. Given the complexities of the tragedy in Darfur, we are disappointed that Dream for Darfur has used such a narrow context by which to evaluate the company’s response," a spokeswoman, Lorie Gawreluk, wrote via e-mail.

General Electric joined in. "We commend Dream for Darfur for raising awareness of this tragic situation, however we strongly disagree with the organization’s approach as well as the use of the Olympic Games as a political platform and the assertions made in the report card," Deirdre Latour, a GE spokeswoman, wrote via e-mail.